Introduction
A statutory minimum wage is an important element of a gender equality policy programme. While much of mainstream economics still assumes that minimum wages distort the functioning of labour markets, there is accumulating evidence that labour markets without regulation do not operate efficiently. Differential rent sharing across industries, imperfect labour mobility and idiosyncratic employer strategies mean there is no tendency towards the law of one price in labour markets. Moreover, these features are gendered: more women than men are likely to be employed in industries where employers have a limited ability to pay, to be hindered by immobility caused by family position and access to welfare benefits and, as a consequence, to be vulnerable to monopsonistic employer power. A minimum wage can act as a strategic instrument in countering some of these distortionary effects and smoothing out some of the imbalances that result from the interactions between sex segmentation of labour supply and sex segregation in employment with processes of wage-setting.
This chapter draws on cross-national empirical evidence to highlight the positive role that can be played by minimum wages, particularly in conjunction with an 'inclusive' industrial relations system, in reducing those distortions in the labour market that are the combined result of institutional arrangements and gendered norms. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section discusses the pervasive notion in labour economics of the law of one price. The chapter then reviews inter national evidence on gender pay gaps among the low paid and identifies an association with country wage-setting systems including minimum wages. The following two sections develop an institutional analysis of women's relative disadvantage in the labour market, from both a supplyand a demand-side perspective. The conclusion sums up the debate and argues for more attention to gender equality issues in minimum wage analysis.
Labour markets and the law of one price
The law of one price still provides the central organizing principle for labour economists' theoretical framework of wage determination. The principle assumes that, in a competitive labour market, workers with similar skill levels and who are employed in similar jobs receive the same wage. The bulk of empirical research on wages takes this principle to measure a variety of 'wage gaps' to signal the degree to which labour markets are distorted from competitive outcomes. Of course, few economists would expect the law of one price to hold 100 per cent in real world labour markets, and there are several notable mainstream contributions that have fostered a more nuanced approach to understanding wage structures (see Oswald and Trostel 2000) . These include studies that identify wage variations linked to: (i) rent sharing, where firm profitability has a positive impact on pay (Slichter 1950; Blanch flower et al. 1996) ; (ii) unions and other institutions such as minimum wage legislation (Bruno and Sachs 1985; Card and Krueger 1995) ; (iii) imperfect labour mobility (especially arising from job search costs, firm-specific training and household decisions, see Mortensen 2003) ; and (iv) firms' payment systems (Lazear 1995) .
Despite the fact that the law of one price fails to hold in several areas of labour market functioning, the core principle is still retained. In a presidential address, labour economist Barry Hirsch defended its retention in the following terms:
There are numerous reasons why Adam Smith's theory of compensating wage differentials and the law of one wage should not and does not strictly hold in real world labor markets. Yet the law of one wage provides a fundamental and remarkably useful approach not only to describe market wage determination, but also to identify and interpret existing wage gaps. It remains our single most powerful tool and the necessary starting point for most wage analyses. This is no small thing. (Hirsch 2008, pp. 931-2) Mainstream empirical research on wages may set out to establish how far empirical reality lies from theoretical predictions but international cross-country research suggests that the size of unaccounted-for wage gaps varies inversely with the presence and strength of labour market institutions. For example, Teulings and Hartog (1998) find that the unexplained variation in wage equations (when wages are regressed on individual human capital characteristics) is greater in the deregulated US and the UK than in Norway and Sweden at the other end of the spectrum. Moreover, Schettkat (2002, table 3.1) demonstrates that these residuals correlate negatively (-0.84 ) with the centralization of wage-setting institutions (using the Calmfors/Driffill ranking). These findings imply that centralized and coordinated wage-setting institutions generate wage structures more in line with the textbook model of competitive, efficient labour markets. While a surprising result for mainstream economists, Schettkat argues it is in fact 'consistent with the view that labour markets are fundamentally imperfect markets and that the transaction costs to achieve the market-clearing equilibrium wage are high in decentralised bargaining systems. From a theoretical perspective, centralised bargaining may collect information and substitute for the auctioneer ' (2002, p. 13) . Research also documents a significant unexplained gap between male and female earnings, which again implies the absence of a law of one price in labour market functioning. In this chapter, we are interested in the extent to which the presence or absence of a statutory minimum wage and strong or weak collective bargaining coverage is associated with the size of the gender pay gap across countries. Our research review focuses in particular on gender gaps among the low skilled and low paid as this is where the impact of a minimum wage is greatest. Our expectation is that labour markets without a minimum wage are less likely to conform to the competitive law of one price than those with stronger low wage protection.
Evidence in the earnings data
The international evidence suggests that although in most countries gender pay gaps are larger among higher-skilled and more-educated workers, they are still positive at the bottom of the pay hierarchy. In this section, we interrogate the available data to explore the nature of these lower-level gaps and their linkages to minimum wage and collective bargaining systems.
Gender gaps at the lowest decile
OECD earnings data reveal considerable variation in gender pay gaps among workers paid at the lowest wage decile, ranging from a positive wage premium of 10 per cent in Hungary to a pay gap of 33 per cent in Germany; the average gap among the 21 countries in the study is 14 per cent. Part of the inter-country variability is explained by differences in earnings data -some countries report hourly pay data, others report weekly or annual data. Also, for most countries the data only cover full-time employees and therefore do not present a fair representation of the gender pay gap, especially in countries with a high share of part-time working. Moreover, for three countries -Denmark, France and the Netherlands -the OECD earnings data include part-time workers and are therefore likely to overestimate the gap compared to the other countries (see Appendix, Table A9 .1).
Nevertheless it is instructive to explore the relationship between size of gender gap at the lowest pay decile and the character of institutions for regulating low-wage work. We divide countries into three groups; those having a relatively high minimum wage (40 per cent or higher of average earnings), a strong and inclusive collective bargaining system (at least 80 per cent coverage) and having neither of these (see Table 9 .1). Two countries, France and Belgium, appear twice with both a high minimum wage and a strong collective bargaining system, but otherwise the lists are mutually exclusive. The main result is that, on average, the lowest decile gender pay gap is smallest (8 per cent) for the group of countries with a high relative level of statutory minimum wage.
For the nine countries with strong collective bargaining coverage, the average pay gap at the lowest decile is 15 per cent. The pay gap is highest at 21 per cent among the group with neither strong collective bargaining coverage nor a high-value statutory minimum wage. This approximate pattern provides some support for the argument that institutional arrangements for regulating low-wage work can reduce women's vulnerability to low pay. They complement the more general finding that more coordinated and centralized wage bargaining institutions generate a more egalitarian wage structure and contribute to closing the gender pay gap (see, most recently, the regression results in EC 2008, pp. 93-4 behind Germany among the 18 countries under consideration -despite near complete collective bargaining coverage estimated at 99%. Part of the explanation is to be found in differential minimum rates in sectoral collective bargaining agreements, with lower rates in female-dominated sectors than in male-dominated sectors. However, in January 2009 social partners established a new cross-sectoral minimum of 1,000 per month as a result of union campaigns. Reports suggest that 'virtually the entire private sector' has been covered by the new cross-sectoral minimum which may reduce the gender pay gap at the bottom (Eironline 2009 ).
Gender differences in the incidence of low-wage work
International studies reveal considerable cross-country diversity in the incidence of low-wage work (for example, Gautié and Schmitt 2010; Grimshaw 2010; Vaughan-Whitehead 2010) . OECD data for 2006 point to a high incidence of low pay among men (17 per cent or more) in Hungary, Poland, the US and the Republic of Korea, yet less than 9 per cent in Denmark, Japan, Finland and Sweden. When we consider low pay among women, the picture of cross-country diversity is even stronger; the Republic of Korea, Japan, Germany, the US and the UK Several studies have linked wage-setting institutions to the incidence of low-wage work. Salverda and Mayhew's (2009) recent study of 13 European countries plus the US identifies a central role for statutory minimum wage and inclusive labour relations in limiting low pay. Schettkat has also found a negative correlation (-0.73 ) between the incidence of low pay and the Calmfors/Driffill ranking of centralization, for a sample of 14 countries (2002, table 3.1) . Less research has been done on the impact of these institutions on the relative incidence of low pay among women. Figure 9 .1 shows the incidence of low pay among women relative to men from 2000 to 2006. Women are more likely than men to be low paid in all countries, with the exception of Hungary where there are doubts about the robustness of the data. Especially large gaps in representation are found in the Republic of Korea, the Czech Republic, Germany and Japan, where data for 2000 suggest women are more than three times more likely than men to be in low-wage work. In countries with a relatively high statutory minimum wage or with strong collective bargaining coverage, there is a lessening of the greater risk for women compared to men (Table 9. 2): on average, in both country groups, women are approximately twice as likely to be low paid as men (a multiple of 1.7 in high minimum-wage countries and 2.1 in strong collective bargaining coverage countries). In countries with neither form of protection, women are almost three times as likely to be low paid compared to men (a multiple of 2.9).
Gender pay ratios in elementary occupations
The pattern in most countries is that the gender pay gaps widen as one moves up the skill or education hierarchy. Data for the EU25 show an average gender pay ratio of 77 per cent in elementary occupations compared to 71 per cent among managers. Similarly, women's earnings drop from 87 per cent of men's earnings among the low educated to 69 per cent among the high educated. Nevertheless, the gender gaps among those in low-skill occupations or with low levels of education are still significant and subject to considerable cross-national variety. Figure 9 .2 presents the average gender pay ratio (hourly earnings) in three low-skilled occupations, for a selection of EU member states. The gender pay ratios range from 70-80 per cent in Austria and the UK to Note: Low pay defined as two-thirds median earnings. Missing low-pay data for Austria, Belgium and Switzerland. Central and Eastern European countries excluded (see Appendix  Table A9 .2 for details). Source: OECD earnings database for low-pay data. All other sources same as 90-100 per cent in Denmark, Sweden and France. The sample of countries is smaller compared to our above exploratory analyses, making the identification of wage system effects more difficult; Nevertheless, there appear to be similar patterns. The UK and Germany are both members of our category of countries with weak collective bargaining coverage and either no or a low minimum wage, and both have wide pay gaps among these relatively low-skilled occupations. This provides further evidence of the risks for women's pay in countries without strong institutions for regulating low wages. Overall, the empirical evidence highlights that even within low-paid or low-graded jobs women fare less well than men and have a significantly higher risk of working in a low-paid job. Both factors contribute significantly to the aggregate gender pay gap. Most importantly for our analysis, we also find that the presence of a relatively high statutory minimum wage or extensive collective bargaining coverage influences the size of gender gaps at the bottom of the labour market. Countries without either are more likely to register wide gender gaps in the indicators examined here. In the next section, we explore in more detail factors on both the supply and the demand side that shape women's vulnerability to low pay. The social structuring of labour supply and the reservation wage
The debate on the impact of labour market regulation on women's labour market position focuses on their tendencies to be labour market outsiders as the result of discontinuous participation (Rubery 2010) . From this perspective employment regulations including minimum wages are said to act against the interests of women (Botero et al. 2004; Bertola et al. 2001) , even though it is mainly women who are recipients of any rise in minimum wages. It is argued that this improvement in pay is offset by decreases in employment opportunities, particularly for those trying to enter the labour market as those who are insiders are protected by the transaction costs of hiring and by investments in their skills (Lindbeck and Snower 2002) . This deregulation debate treats the discontinuity of women's employment as a universal gender characteristic, rather than as a product of particular family, employment and welfare regimes, so that the policy imperative is not to harm the prospects for women as outsiders, rather than to change policy regimes to encourage women to become insiders/continuous employees. One element of the latter approach would be to improve pay so that it is more 'worthwhile' for women to work. Much of the variation in labour supply patterns between men and women is not necessarily related to the biological act of childbirth but to the ways in which the family, employment, tax and welfare regimes treat women and mothers. These conditions may account for not only gender differences but also cross-country differences by gender in key labour supply characteristics such as 'reservation wages' or commitments to continuous employment. Moreover, as the new literature on monopsony suggests, it is women's vulnerability related to their responsibilities in respect of family and childcare that may leave them exposed to employer 'exploitation', due to labour supply inelasticity. We take these three features -reservation wages, employment continuity and job mobility -to develop a gendered labour supply perspective on the need for minimum wages as an element in equal opportunity policy.
Gender and reservation wages
There are two reasons why women may have lower reservation wages; first they are less likely to be in receipt of state support -in the form of unemployment benefits; and second they may be socialized to expect to be at least partially economically dependent and to make only a marginal rather than a full proportional contribution to total family income. Because family systems, welfare state arrangements and social norms vary between countries, so will the extent and intensity of these effects. That is, these are not 'essential' gender characteristics, but so long as they persist there is a need to protect women against taking up wage offers that may reflect women's reservation wages rather than their productive potential. The importance of unemployment benefits as an alternative means of providing a wage floor to minimum wages has been pointed out by Gregg (2000) . He notes the patchy coverage of unemployment benefits even in welfare states with well-developed unemployment benefits systems.
In the absence of minimum wages, benefits paid to those not in work are likely to act as wage floors. The variation in eligibility and generosity means that they are individual wage floors not society wide ones. Hence they do not mimic a minimum wage but create an upward sloping labour supply curve, whereby a higher wage broadens the proportion of the workless willing to work at the offered wage. In the case of earnings related benefits, this profile may mimic the individuals' potential wage quite well. In other circumstances there is no reason why it should. (Gregg 2000, p. 137) The groups most likely to be excluded from benefits are those with short and discontinuous work histories, those in non-standard jobs (especially where these are outside social protection) and, where access to benefits is means tested, those living in households with at least one wage-earner. These groups include young people (who may implicitly be expected to rely on family support) and women. Table 9 .3 indicates the much lower level of access of women to benefits among the unemployed in some countries. The EU15 countries with the largest gender gaps among unemployed benefit recipients are the UK, Ireland and Spain (as well as the Netherlands according to Gallie and Paugam 2000) , while Italy and Greece have low coverage for all (see also Grimshaw and Rubery 1997; Leschke 2007) .
Where there is fairly uniform coverage by gender the rate may be both high and low. Where male coverage is low, as in Italy and Greece, then men as well as women may rely on intra-family support when they are unemployed, a system made possible by the continuation of more extended family systems based on income pooling in these countries (Karamessini 2008 ). Low reservation wages may not lead to low-wage employment if wage systems are still protected. However, where employment and wage protection is limited low reservation wages may lead to low-wage employment. Differences in eligibility for unemployment benefits by gender are often not taken into account even in studies testing for the impact of unemployment benefits on the employment of women and men. For example, in the cross-country study by Bassanini and Duval (2006) for the OECD fairly strong negative impacts on employment for women from high unemployment benefits were found. However, the authors were surprised that the effects on full-time and part-time employment were similar as they hypothesized that high benefits would have a greater impact on lower-paid part-timers. However, the data were based on benefit levels rather than on the eligibility of women in general or part-timers in particular for benefits -conditions that can be expected to vary between countries. The consequence of ineligibility for benefits may be that many women who are without work but wish to work are likely to consider themselves as inactive rather than unemployed. This status of being without an independent income may impact on the willing ness to take low-waged work. Manning (2003) has found that more women enter into employment from non-employment and that these earn less than those entering jobs from employment after the usual controls including experience, thereby contributing to the gender pay gap. This tendency to receive lower wages is likely to be exacerbated where women do not have access to unemployment benefits as an alternative to low-wage employment. Men in societies with developed welfare states tend to rely on the state when without employment but in many societies for women their key source of support when not in employment is the family. Indeed, many societies expect women to take time away from wage employment to care for children and may not provide substitute income through highly paid parental leave, thereby presuming that women can and will be dependants -at least for a period. This presumption of income pooling reinforces the tendency for women to have low reservation wages when they return to employment. The potential for women to undercut the wages paid to male workers led to the Webbs (1920) referring to women as parasitic workers and the industries in which they were employed as parasitic industries. As Power explains, this approach locates women's lower wages not in their lower potential productivity but in their position in the domestic economy which leads to their use by employers as a source of cheap labour:
This parasitic-industries analysis is interesting for a number of reasons. First, parasitic-industries arguments began the analysis of wages not with an assumption of freely choosing individuals and clearing markets, but rather with a vision of a disorganized and predatory economic environment, with large and damaging differentials in power and information between workers (particularly women and children) and employers. Second, the analysis presumed that workers' productivity was much more an outcome of the organization of jobs by employers than of workers' own behavior. If employers could get workers cheaply (because of their relative powerlessness), they would not bother to use workers productively. Third, the analysis focused on the effects of low wages on the community as a whole, putting priority on the macro-efficiency of labor market outcomes. (Power 1999, p. 63) This argument in relation to parasitic workers and industries emerged in the original debates on establishing a minimum wage in the US and resurfaced again in living wage campaigns (Power 1999) . The lack of an effective social welfare system in the US coupled with a higher predominance of racial in addition to gender inequalities has heightened the importance of low pay in poverty prevention (Nolan and Marx 2009 ) and also extended concerns over low pay to men as well as women.
Two features of the debate around minimum wages as living wages are of particular importance for gender equality. presumes that participation in full-time work should enable an adult to cover their living costs. To the extent that they worked full-time this approach would reduce women's dependence on their partners. Second, living wage campaigns target the clients of low-paying employers -that is, those organizations further up the value chain that typically have a greater ability to pay. This approach recognizes that firms in competitive sectors may be exploited by more powerful clients to provide services at low wages, causing them to seek out and exploit those workers with the weakest bargaining power -such as migrant workers or women.
The scenario has analogies with the debate on how less developed countries can secure a fair reward for their contribution to global value chains; powerful clients extract value while the weaker bargaining position of workers and firms further down the value chain allows a redistribution of value to wealthy economies (Heintz 2007) . Seguino (2000) adds a gender dimension to this argument by arguing that export growth in some developing countries is dependent upon gender inequalities. Both the developed world receiving the exports and the less developed exporting societies benefit at the expense of the underpayment of female workers employed in export processing zones. Export growth may be beneficial for domestic investment, but the process is subsidized by women through their high efforts relative to wages. Thus the low wage received by women in such contexts is regarded as reflective of their weak bargaining power -particularly in the face of mobile capital -rather than their weak productivity or productivity potential. The reliance of the export growth model on gender inequality is related to the reduced likelihood that gender inequalities will lead to overt political conflict.
The economic effects of conflict … are transmitted through the negative impact on investment and macroeconomic policy. These differing results may be reconciled by recognizing that inequality is less likely to produce social conflict if the burden is born by women, a group traditionally socialized to accept gender inequality as a socially acceptable outcome. (Seguino 2000 (Seguino , p. 1212 The presumption of acquiescence by women in the receipt of low pay may also lie behind other social and employment policies. For example, the UK has adopted a policy of providing state subsidies to almost all adults aged over 25 in low-wage work, except if the individual is in a relationship with another person who is in relatively high-paid work. Apart from young people the most important low-wage group not subsidized under this scheme are women from couple households. This policy was designed to encourage unemployed 'breadwinners' to take up low-wage work since in the 1990s the majority of jobs available to the unemployed were part-time and low-paid and were being taken by the inactive -primarily women -in households with at least one income-earner. This approach re-establishes the notion of a family wage -albeit at an implied low level of subsistence -provided in part by employers and in part by the state, and it leaves unchallenged the payment of wages below subsistence or living wage levels to those deemed to be supported by the family. However, one rather unintended consequence of the spread of in-work benefits has been an explicit policy of maintaining and improving the level of the national minimum wage in the UK to prevent employers from taking too much advantage of the subsidy. The possibility that the wages of young people and women are suppressed because of family subsidies is not, however, acknowledged directly.
Gender and labour market outsiders
One principal basis for the claim that employment regulation, including minimum wages, is harmful is that the costs are borne primarily by labour market outsiders in the form of foregone earnings for those remaining unemployed or through lower earnings for those who consequently work in the informal sector. This argument raises two main issues for gender equality. First, instead of focusing on the problems for outsiders, it may be more productive to aim to reduce the gap between men as insiders and women as outsiders -by offering opportunities for paid leave, flexible working and affordable childcare to enable women to retain their position in the labour market. Moreover, women's status as 'outsiders' or 'marginal' participants results not only from work-family conflicts but also from specific tax regimes that favour labour market withdrawal or engagement in marginal or unstable jobs. These tax restrictions arise out of specific welfare regimes that reinforce women's position as outsiders. Second, UK evidence suggests the costs of women's overrepresentation in labour market flows has increased as there has been a widening of the gap between entry wages and wages for those in continuous employment (including those who have changed jobs) (Gregg and Wadsworth 2000) . More entry-level jobs are located at the bottom of the labour market and in the absence of policies to reduce women's risk of being outsiders, minimum wage regulation can protect against any further widening of gaps between entry wages and continuing employment wages. Research into this widening of the entry wage gap found little difference between men and women, but the implication is that employers treat a spell out of the labour market for childrearing as being equivalent to the same period of unemployment (the main cause of most men being outsiders). The same study shows, however, that the wage penalty of part-time work, which correlates with women's employment in the UK, is significantly higher for entry wages than for continuing jobs (Gregg and Wadsworth 2000, table 7). There are two different interpretations of policies to protect wages for new entrants. For some this may help to reduce the penalties of discontinuous employment which in the UK are sufficiently large that those entering on these low wages may never make up the gap. Alternatively, this entry wage gap may be regarded as reflecting real losses in human capital consequent upon employment interruption. If so, as Gregg and Wadsworth argue, the deterioration in human capital -whether from education or from employment experience -must be much more rapid than any estimates of its formation. To reduce gender wage inequalities it is likely that a combination of measures is necessary: minimum wages to prevent exploitation of re-entrants and measures to help women retain their footholds in the labour market.
Gender, job mobility and monopsony
Monopsony implies that employers have power in the labour market and are able to use that power to reduce wage levels below 'competitive' levels. This power derives in part from the restricted options available to the labour they employ. Women have less access to unemployment benefits than men and may therefore have a lower reservation wage. In addition, women have more limited job options because of their family responsibiliities. This family position may mean they are only able to take jobs within a certain geographical area or with certain working hours due to commitments. Manning (2003) argues that women in the UK are increasingly long-term and committed workers, with a reduced tendency to work intermittently. This increases the inelasticity of labour supply to the employer as they may have limited incentives to seek jobs with better pay or longer hours due to both specific tax incentives and restrictions on geographical mobility. These may be intensified by limited local transport, internal family dynamics (for example, who has access to the family car, who has childcare responsibility) and by welfare and education arrangements, such as the length of the school day and the availability and costs of childcare. These vary across societies. For example, there is a short school day in Germany and a much longer school day in France which may help to explain the greater incidence 
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of women in short hour local jobs in Germany. Conditions also change over time; from the 1990s onwards there were increases in women's access to private transport in the UK, but the gender differences remain (Smith et al. 2006) . Women benefit more than men from improvements in local transport rather than long-distance commuting, so that different policy priorities will impact on monopsony effects. Women's limited access to alternative income sources and job choices means that they are more exposesd than men to the risk of monopsony power. Their labour supply to an individual employer is less price elastic than men's, even if women at a more aggregate level are regarded as having a more price-elastic demand curve.
1 A distinction needs to be made between general rises in real wages, which may attract more women into the labour market by changing the trade-off between domestic work and wage work (Mincer 1962) , and the extent of labour market choices for women who are already committed to employment. Although we have identified that vulnerability to monopsony power may be reduced by a range of policies, the most direct protection is the introduction of legal minimum wages. Under monopsony, minimum wage rises may not only raise pay but also improve employment opportunities. There are disputes over whether there is robust evidence of employment increases following minimum wage hikes - Neumark and Wascher (2006) , for example, question Card and Kreuger's (1994) results -but there is near consensus that the employment effects of minimum wage rises are small (Freeman 2005 (Freeman , 2007 , at least within the range of minimum wage increases experienced in most OECD countries over recent years. However, to a large extent the degree of monopsony, or vulnerability to low wages that is experienced by women, is also influenced by the organization of the demand side, the topic to which we now turn.
Organization of the demand side
The argument we have developed is that minimum wages are needed to help to create a more level playing field or fairer treatment. So far we have made the case primarily in respect of supply-side reasons and vulnerability to monopsony. Here we turn to demand-side factors and labour market institutions that create or sustain gender inequalities which could be reduced by the application of effective minimum wage policies. Two primary arguments need to be made here; first, in the absence of a minimum wage, we would not expect firms or sectors to pay uniform minimum wage levels. Instead wage levels, even for the lower skilled, are likely to reflect differences in sectoral ability to pay (economic rents). Not only do women tend to be located in sectors where rents are low but they may also benefit less from the sharing of rents in sectors where these are sizeable. National minimum wages may reduce disparities between male-and female-dominated sectors and workplaces, thereby contributing to a narrowing of the gender pay gap. Second, there are significant variations between societies -linked to their industrial relations institutions and their approach to gender equality -that influence the extent of women's vulnerability to low pay and the need for minimum wages to improve their protection. Labour markets can be categorized as relatively inclusive or exclusive (Gautié and Schmitt 2009) , but even within these categorizations, some differences in gender effects are also likely to exist.
Gender segregation and wage setting arrangements
Recent empirical research as summarized above has established that wages in the absence of regulation do not tend towards the law of one price. Instead weak regulation may increase wage dispersion while more coordinated wage-setting arrangements may reduce wage dispersion. Although industry effects are observed widely, their size varies not only between countries but also for men and women. In their exploration of interindustry differences in six countries, Gannon et al. (2007) Moreover this research found that inter-industry wage differentials explain important but variable shares of the gender pay gaps between countries. Variations were found in the importance of both differences in gender distribution across sectors, and in gender differences in industry wage premia. Wider dispersion of industry wage premia is associated with more decentralized or less extensive wage bargaining. Ireland has the largest industry effects related to large differences in gender wage differentials by sector; indeed, wage dispersion by industry is much larger for women, indicating that men have been able to escape low pay -even in low-paying sectors. These results all relate to 1995 and Ireland provides a potentially interesting case for further research as the 9780230302174_10_cha09.indd 242 9780230302174_10_cha09.indd 242 3/9/2011 8:24:07 PM 3/9/2011 8:24:07 PM PROOF implementation of a national minimum wage after 1995 might have narrowed gender wage differentials within sectors and narrowed wage dispersion for women relative to men. The lack of evidence for a law of one price under de-regulation suggests that minimum wages could increase comparability in wages between sectors. It is not only gender segregation across workplaces that matters, but also the size of wage penalties for gender segregation. Coordinated bargaining systems may do more to reduce these penalties than minimum wages as minimum wages can at most affect the wage floor, rather than the overall level of inequalities. Nevertheless it may be easier to implement a minimum wage than to develop coordinated wage-setting institutions with high coverage. Moreover, not all coordinated systems promote gender equality as evidence above with respect to Austria suggests.
A second important conclusion of the Gannon et al. (2007) study is that different industrial relations systems provide for different inter actions with the gender pay gap and that targeted policies are needed. This is supported by other research into the interactions between the gender pay gap and forms of wage setting. For example, a UK study shows that once gender segregation at the workplace is included the impact of gender as an individual characteristic on wages became insignificant (Forth and Millward 2001) . This suggests it was the opportunity to pay low wages to all provided by the patterns of gender segregation that was most significant in generating low pay for women. These organizations were almost all outside the collective bargaining systems and were thus most likely to be affected by the introduction of a national minimum wage.
However, the impact of wage floors depends upon the starting points. In some contexts they may provide a new floor to the labour market and reduce gender pay gaps, but in others they may provide opportunities to pay minimum rates rather than observe those in collective agreements (Grimshaw and Rubery 2010) . The availability of a range of minimum rates may lead to new strategies to pay lower wages. For example, Finland does not have a statutory minimum wage but it does have a hierarchy of collective agreements; research suggests that sex segregation by collective agreements is a separate and increasing cause of the gender pay gap, particularly for part-time workers (Laine 2008) . Also, in both Germany and Austria companies have been evading highpaying collective agreements -in Germany companies switch to no collective bargaining or make use of the new but low-wage agreement for temporary workers (Mitlacher 2007) , while in Austria there has been a process of switching from high-paying to low-paying agreements (Hermann and Flecker 2009) . It is this wide variation among collective agreements in Austria that prompted unions to press for a new 1,000 monthly minimum wage while in Germany the issue of whether or not to introduce a statutory national minimum wage is still unresolved (Bosch and Weinkopf 2010) . Women, particularly those in mini jobs, are the most likely to be low-paid and outside collective regulation but this applied even before the recent decline in collective coverage, such that the fastest rate of increase among the low paid is among men (Bosch and Kalina 2008) . It is perhaps the increasing effects of deregulation on men that have promoted an active debate on minimum wages in Germany when previously the low wages paid to women excited less interest among trade unions.
Other institutional arrangements and practices interact with the industrial relations systems to shape the impact of minimum wages on women's vulnerability to low pay. A key example of the differences in the importance of the minimum wage in protecting women applies to the care sector across EU countries. Simonazzi's (2009) comparative study makes clear that in the UK the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage had a major impact on care workers' wages just at the time when the majority of care work was outsourced to private providers. In contrast, there is less influence in countries where care work is either organized as a skilled profession (Sweden and Germany) or relies on the informal sector (Italy).
The extent to which women's vulnerability to low pay is actually manifest in particular sectors, firms, occupations or contract types is thus highly dependent upon a range of institutional factors, including the industrial relations systems. The importance of minimum wage protection as a means of countering vulnerability varies across countries and over time, but industrial relations systems are also changing constantly so that women may face new risks of being employed on low wages even within regulated labour markets.
The need to refocus minimum wage debates on gender equity
The analysis presented has suggested how low-wage segments may develop along gendered lines, with women facing particular forms of discrimination and disadvantage. These tendencies towards low pay and pay discrimination among women are far from inevitable. The size and form of low-wage labour supply groups is historically and culturally contingent and the impact of the segmentation of labour supply on the structure of jobs in the economy is mediated through the effects of regulations, collective bargaining, industrial structure, state policy and the like. However, the dominance of the de-regulation debate means that many of these mediating and protective factors are being called into question. Although our analysis provides a general approach to understanding why labour standards are required (see also Deakin in this volume), in this final section we consider the need for minimum wage debates to focus more on the issue of gender pay equity. Table 9 .4 outlines the advantages and disadvantages of minimum wages for promoting gender pay equity. A refocusing of the minimum wage debate on issues of gender discrimination is needed for three main reasons. First, debates about minimum wages typically focus on their impact on household poverty and are dismissive of their policy relevance where secondary earners (often women who are dependent on their male partner's earnings) dominate. However, there is a major danger in ignoring the growth of low-wage and non-standard employment (Vosko in this volume) as it may herald a destabilization in conditions for higher-wage workers, calling into question custom and practice in working hours, pay premia and other benefits as well as wage levels. Such problems are likely to be more acute where the weakness of minimum wage regulation and collective bargaining has allowed for wide wage inequality (as in the US, the UK and Spain). Moreover, even when household income is raised above poverty levels through the wages of other household members, problems in relation to poverty may emerge; intra-household distribution may mean that not only women's standard of living but also that of children may be at or below poverty levels. Furthermore, reliance on low wages may lead to future poverty due to household dissolution. Dependence upon another adult does not just contravene human dignity but also introduces major economic risks for women that are shown in the poverty distributions for single parents and older workers.
Second, minimum wages provide an effective and important means of reducing pay inequities between male and female workers by establishing a fair price for individual effort among low-paid workers. The case for action to reduce gender pay discrimination should stand in its own right and not be dependent upon other arguments, such as the impact on household income distribution. The principle of equal pay for equivalent work is in fact assumed within the mainstream economics framework; therefore the argument against minimum wages as a means of reducing pay discrimination implies that current wage structures are independent of the sex of the worker taking the job. However, most mainstream studies still find evidence of discrimination by gender in the labour market as a whole and it would be remarkable if this was not found and indeed concentrated among the lowest-paid groups. One problem is that the presence of some low-paid men may be taken as evidence that low pay reflects low skill rather than gender, but where women dominate the low-paid sector, disadvantaged men may find themselves tied to rates which reflect the low valuation of women's work. The third reason for minimum wages is that this form of protection is typically more encompassing, in terms of the coverage of labour force groups, than many other welfare and labour market institutions and therefore is more likely to cover all, including women, at risk of working at very low wages. Even here there are still groups such as domestic workers that may not be covered (see Tomei in this volume). Other labour market floors such as unemployment benefits are less encompassing and introduce significant indirect gender bias through rules governing entitlement and the level and duration of payments. This exclusion applies to other disadvantaged groups such as the young and migrants. Moreover, even in countries categorized as having an inclusive system of industrial relations, collective bargaining and union representation may still be weaker in many low-wage sectors where women are overrepresented, particularly personal services and domestic work.
Nevertheless, a minimum wage is only one element in ensuring gender pay equity and is not a substitute for developing an inclusive approach to wage-setting, since union representation and widespread collective bargaining coverage are the main means for developing a transparent wage structure that provides for fair comparison above the lowest-paid jobs. Indeed, in the absence of strong institutions to regulate the pay structure above the minimum, women in senior or skilled positions in sectors affected by minimum wage hikes may face wage compression -a scenario that appears consistent with changes in the UK earnings distribution in recent years (Denvir and Loukas 2007) . It is also possible that a statutory minimum wage substitutes for a higher minimum in collective wage agreements in some contexts.
Thus minimum wages do not offer a panacea for gender pay inequity but still constitute an essential element of any comprehensive policy to tackle the persistent gender pay gap. The starting points for effective policy have to be first a rejection of the notion that it is institutions which distort fair and efficient labour market outcomes and, second, the development of a universal rather than a partial wage floor. Any comprehensive 
